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The Internet of Things (IoT) is the technology buzzword of the day. The number of network-
connected devices has now exceeded the world population, and recent market research 
estimates that 8.4 billion connected ‘things’ will be in use in 2017.1 IoT technologies add an 
online identity to objects that have traditionally had only a physical identity – from fridges, to 
cars to power plants – enabling these objects to be virtually sensed, analysed and even 
actuated.  
Governments around the world realise the socio-economic potential of IoT, and are eagerly 
exploring how their economies might harness the benefits from live data flows and 
customisation across sectors as diverse as healthcare, manufacturing, infrastructure 
management and utilities.2 In 2015, the UK Government set its aspiration to become “a world 
leader in the development and implementation of the Internet of Things.”3 However, it also 
acknowledged that IoT raises unique challenges to data protection and the security of 
information systems and networks. These concerns are hardly unique to the UK. Connected 
‘things’ are being manufactured and traded around the world. In most cases today, devices 
are built with extremely limited security specifications designed into their hardware or 
software, raising significant concerns about the security of rapidly expanding IoT networks. 
Below we explore the regulatory approaches emerging in the EU and US in response to the 
security and privacy challenges of IoT. We find that the preference has, thus far at least, been 
for light touch regulation, though American and European approaches might soon diverge. 
Regardless, in order to effectively manage risks and enable societal and economic benefits, 
we argue governments like the UK need to develop new institutional coordination models 
that can enable a broad ‘culture of security’ for IoT across public and private sectors alike. 
Responses to the Privacy and Security Challenges of IoT 
Limited security specifications in IoT devices signal a market failure that could require 
regulatory intervention. Manufacturers have limited economic incentives to include 
adequate security specifications in their IoT devices, as these can bring up costs and reduce 
the battery life of their products. In a recent example in 2016, IoT devices located around the 
world were used as launch platforms for DDoS attacks against two established Domain Name 
Servers – OVH and Dyn – resulting in a temporary interruption of their services. The devices 
were compromised by overriding easily guessable passwords set by their manufacturers.4  
In the EU and the US, the response to such vulnerabilities has been to promote the principle 
of “security by design”5 for manufacturers of IoT devices and, gradually, to extend this 
principle to “security by default”6 and “data protection by design and by default”7 for the 
wider management of data, information systems and networks.  
There are, however, a number of challenges to implementing these principles. First, they refer 
to a wide array of existing and emerging standards in cybersecurity and data protection, 
ranging from technical specifications for encryption at device level to cybersecurity risk 
management at the organisational level. Thus, at the moment, the landscape for privacy and 
security standards that apply to IoT is increasingly complex, and the market has so far 
indicated limited convergence towards a core set of standards to support these principles. 
Second, given the wide application of IoT, standards are being developed within, rather than 
across, sectoral verticals. Moreover, at the moment, these principles are non-binding in both 
the EU and the US, highlighting the ‘light touch’ regulatory approach to IoT that makes 
compliance with a responsible level of security and data protection difficult to ensure.    
There are indications, though, that the regulatory pathways for IoT in the EU and the US might 
soon diverge. In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679), which will apply 
from 2018, makes “data protection by design and by default” a mandatory requirement. 
Given that guidelines for applying these principles have not yet been formulated, it is not 
clear whether their ambit will be large enough to encompass the security by design challenges 
of IoT. If guidelines for data protection by design and by default are not formulated to 
encompass the principle of ‘security by design,’ then it might take longer for the EU to pass 
new legislation for an IoT certification scheme, as recently signalled by the European 
Commission.8  
In the US, there are indications that the regulatory approach to IoT will remain light-touch. 
The Federal Trade Commission and the Department for Homeland Security have already 
promoted a number of non-binding guidelines and best practices for securing IoT, making 
reference to the framework standards designed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). The NIST standards point towards a more systemic, end-to-end approach 
to securing IoT as part of the wider management of cybersecurity risk in critical infrastructure. 
The emphasis is currently on “engineering trust”9 in cyber physical systems rather than 
developing separate rules for data protection and for the security of information systems and 
networks.  
Pathways to Governing IoT  
The divergence of pathways for regulating IoT in the EU and US could slow down the global 
adoption of core standards for data protection and security of IoT. In the interim, however, 
both approaches require governments to consider the wider institutional challenges for 
enabling IoT to develop in a secure and trustworthy manner. Security or data protection by 
design have such a large ambit that they cannot rely solely on top down measures for 
regulating IoT. Governments must search deeper in their policy toolbox to enable the 
institutional capacity of private and public entities to coordinate and respond in an adaptive 
manner to rapidly evolving security and privacy challenges.   
Thus, governments must consider their wider “orchestration” and “mobilisation” role in order 
to “activate networks for public problem solving”10. Such tools can rely on training 
programmes in data minimisation and information and network security that do not target 
only providers of government contracts, but also small and medium size organisations who 
cannot easily cover the costs of implementing and upgrading cybersecurity measures to 
tackle the unique risks of IoT. In addition, governments can simplify information sharing 
mechanisms between private enterprises and government agencies concerned with the 
security of interconnected cyber and physical infrastructures. Governments can use positive 
incentives to promote the wider adoption of information assurance schemes in the private 
sector and, in turn, these measures can allow the insurance market to better assess exposure 
and model cybersecurity risks.  
All these measures point to significant changes in the governance of risk and cultures of 
security currently in place across private and public sectors. The UK government has already 
indicated its preference for “a flexible and proportionate model for regulation in domains 
affected by the Internet of Things”, signalling a concern that strong IoT regulation could 
disable its capacity for growth.11 Given its exit from the EU, the UK government might have a 
greater opportunity to consider alternative policy and regulatory designs to achieve its vision 
for IoT. 
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